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**The born frees: The prospects for
generational change in post-apartheid
South Africa**


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Introduction

Political culture theory explains political instability and change as the result of incongruity between mass attitudes and values on one hand, and political institutions on the other (Almond and Verba 1963). Thus, the “third wave of democracy” that swept across the globe from 1975 to 2005 is seen, variously, as the result of the failure of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to supply sufficient economic and political goods to satisfy their citizens, or more broadly the mismatch between the operating norms of the regime and its constituent institutions and those of the mass public. The key question that occupies public opinion researchers working in new democracies, however, is whether the value structures that questioned and de-legitimated the former authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are sufficient to legitimate and consolidate new liberal or even electoral democracies.

Perhaps nowhere is this issue better illustrated than in southern Africa where the presence of colonial and settler regimes well into the latter half of the 20th century diverged sharply with even the most minimal human aspirations for dignity, freedom and self-determination. The most extreme manifestation of this was, of course, *apartheid* South Africa. Whereas most repressive regimes at least made claims that they were delivering some goods valued by their populations (rightist regimes claimed to deliver national self-determination, order, or development; leftist regime claimed to deliver equality and a form of democracy that was more advanced than their liberal, bourgeois competitors), South Africa’s ruling National Party could claim, at best, that it was protecting traditional indigenous cultures from the polluting impact of modernity and preparing Africans for self-government in their own countries. But Verwoerdian appeals to cultural relativism and paternalist tutelage were constantly exposed by the harshness of everyday life, whether in the urban townships, the farms of “white” South Africa, or in the Bantustan homelands, and by the near totalitarian reach of the *apartheid* regime and its intrusion into the most intimate aspects the lives of coloured, Indian and black South Africans.

Apartheid lasted for a surprisingly long time (1948 to 1994), and probably could have survived at least another ten years if not for the decisive reforms of FW de Klerk. But while we have little scientific evidence about the state of public attitudes amongst black South Africans, few would suggest that this was because black South Africans saw the regime as legitimate, or even remotely agreed with its basic norms and principles. Thus, in the language of political culture theory, *apartheid* ultimately fell because the norms of racial separation, racial hierarchy and white superiority were rejected by the vast majority of the South African populace.

Yet while popular support for norms such as dignity, equality, freedom, non-racialism and majority rule may have led to the demise of *apartheid*, it is by no means certain that these norms are sufficient to support a liberal democracy. Here we do have extensive social scientific evidence, and virtually all of it agrees that South Africans -- of all races -- pay minimal lip service to the idea of democracy, and that significant minorities would be willing to countenance one party rule or strong man dictatorship especially if these regimes would promise economic development (or may simply believe erringly that those regimes are consistent with democracy) (Mattes and Thiel 1998; Mattes 2001; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes & Bratton 2007). South Africans also display high levels of intolerance of political difference (Gibson & Gouws 2003) and the highest levels of xenophobia measured anywhere in the world (Mattes, Taylor, McDonald, Poore & Richmond 1999).

Thus, to the extent that political culture is ultimately important to the survival and quality of democracy, *culture change* is a fundamentally important issue confronting South Africa. But is it possible to turn non-democrats into democrats? And if so, what are the key factors or processes? And is this process equally likely to happen across the entire public or is it more probable amongst certain segments or age cohorts? Public opinion researchers have identified a range of different possible routes for this kind of attitude change. One possible route is simply to wait for sufficient time to pass whereby citizens become habituated to democracy after repeated exposure to and involvement in democratic practice (sometimes referred to as “routinization”) (Rustow 1970). A second route lies in (re)designing political institutions so as to give people greater incentives to tolerate political opponents, join civic associations, contact elected leaders, participate in collective action and defend democracy if it were under threat (Hadenius 2001). A third possible path lies in improving the quality of the country’s political institutions (often referred to as institutionalization) so they can perform better and demonstrate to citizens that democracy can produce

the political and economic goods that satisfy people's self interests (Przeworski 1995).

A different set of potential mechanisms depend far less on individual attitude change across the populace and concentrate instead on achieving aggregate culture change through the replacement of older generations with new, more democratic cohorts. Changes of this type are almost all based in some way on what Inglehart (1990) calls the *socialization hypothesis*. That is, the experiences of late adolescence have an exceptionally powerful influence on the development of individual attitudes and are more powerful than subsequent "period" or "life cycle" effects. However, scholars differ over exactly what it is that is most important during late adolescence. One school of thought points to the conscious teaching of pro-democratic values and preferences to the young through civil society and mass media, but largely through the schooling system aided by reformed school curricula and, or new teaching methods (Slomczynski and Shabad, 1998).¹ Scholars have documented significant increases in pro-democratic values and attitudes in a series of newly democratic, post-authoritarian societies such as West Germany (Baker et al 1981), Austria (Muller 1984), Italy (Sami 1980), Japan (Flanagan and Richardson 1984; Richardson 1974) and Spain (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986; and Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1997). In each of these societies, new democratic regimes remoulded citizens' beliefs into a culture supportive of democracy, largely through committed efforts in the schools, but also in media and civil society, to educate a new generation of democratically minded citizens. Dalton's (1994, 471-472) description of the Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative.

Confronted by an uncertain public commitment to democracy, the government undertook a massive programme to re-educate the public. The schools, the media and political organizations were mobilized behind the effort. And the citizenry itself was changing – older generations raised under authoritarian regimes were being replaced by younger generations socialized during the postwar democratic era. These efforts created a political culture congruent with the new institutions and processes of the Federal Republic. The West German public also learned democratic norms by continued exposure to the new political system. As a result, a popular consensus slowly developed in support of the democratic political system.

¹ While the efficacy of adult civic education has been demonstrated (e.g. Finkel 2002; Finkel and Ernst 2005), it is not covered in this review since it would have to be conducted on a vast scale in order to have any realistic prospect of effecting broad culture change.

Other scholars, however, account for generational change not so much by changes in the *content* of education as by changes in the quantity and quality of education received by new generations which results in higher levels of cognitive sophistication. Often times, such interpretations are advanced by the same authors, depending on the situation. For example, while Dalton emphasized different education content in the case of post-war Germany, his analysis of value change in post-war United States focuses emphasized the rapid expansion of university education (Dalton, 2009). At the same time, we must take at least some note of the fact that the rapidly accumulating literature on public opinion in the new “3rd Wave democracies” has, thus far, produced very little of important generational differences in support for democracy (e.g. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Markowski 2005; Rose, Mishler and Munro 2006; and Chu et al 2008).

A second type of explanation of generational change focuses on the new and unique *experiences* encountered by the young, experiences that differ significantly from those of older generations and which result in the formation of significantly different values. In new democracies, these experiences might consist of new political freedoms, civil liberties and forms of democratic participation that are taken for granted by younger generations with no memories of the pre-democratic past. Other scholars, however, focus on material and physiological needs and how they result in changes in subjective existential security. Inglehart (1990) argues that the most important influences on subsequent attitudes are those things that are in least supply during adolescence (what he calls the *scarcity hypotheses*), with priority going first to basic needs, then to material needs, and finally to post-material self-expression needs, or “liberty aspirations” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

South Africa’s political generations

South Africa’s democratization process offers a useful laboratory in which to begin testing these various arguments. In addition to the vast social, economic and political change that South Africa has experienced since 1990, post-*apartheid* South Africa has undergone rapid demographic change. Over one third of South Africa’s present electorate is now too young to have any direct memory of race classification, passes, or official segregation of churches, schools, residence and inter-personal relationships, the drastic repression of dissidence and resistance, or the armed resistance and popular struggle against *apartheid*. Nor do they have any experiential memory of FW De Klerk’s historic release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of liberation movements, the

searing violence of the transition period, the momentous 1994 election, or the conclusive 1996 passage of the country's Constitution.

But let us first take a step back and look at the entire present day electorate. Post-*apartheid* society consists of five distinct political generations. Each generation is associated with an era characterized internally by continuity in social, economic and political trends, but which is demarcated by major historical disjunctures that sharply distinguish it from surrounding eras. But while all South Africans were shaped by the continuous trends within each era, they were most certainly affected in very different ways depending on their racial classification. The oldest, and smallest group, the *Pre-Apartheid* generation, reached their politically formative years (defined here as the age of 16) before the historic victory of the National Party in the 1948 election and the imposition of race classification. While this cohort still constituted a significant proportion of the electorate in 1994, it has now shrunk to less than 2 percent of all voters, and will be folded into in the next youngest generation in the empirical analysis in this paper. The next group, the *Early Apartheid* generation, comprises people who turned 16 between 1948 and 1960, meaning that they have no working memory of life before the rise of the National Party and the imposition of “petty” *apartheid*, or the legal matrix of laws imposing and enforcing racial classification and separation. Neither would these people have had any experience in early adulthood of any significant popular resistance to *apartheid*.

The third cohort, what I call the *Grand Apartheid* generation, consists of those citizens whose early memories were seared by the first stirrings of internal black resistance – the Peco uprising, and the marches that led to the Sharpeville massacre in 1961 – as well as foreign news of gathering decolonization and even Kenya's Mau-Mau rebellion. Yet their memories of late adolescence and early adulthood also carry the recollection of the post Sharpeville reaction of the NP government which banned virtually all black political movements and imprisoned a whole generation of leaders, the most prominent being Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. Indeed, throughout most of these people's early adult lives, the *apartheid* system and the new Republic (South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth in 1960) were marked by increasing confidence. Under the leadership of HF Verwoerd, the NP government moved toward the idea of “grand *apartheid*” and separate development through the Bantustan system with the ultimate aim of reversing black urbanization away from the “white” cities and suburbs and creating a constellation of independent black republics within the borders of white South Africa. During this period, African children were gradually moved out of church based mission schools and into government schools ordered along the new

principles of “Christian National Education.” The other dominant characteristic of this period was South Africa’s rapid growth and industrialization which saw a significant increase in African incomes, a process that itself began to sow the seeds of the demise of grand *apartheid* by attracting more and more Africans to urban townships to meet the expanding need for industrial labour.

White confidence and African quiescence came to an abrupt end in 1976 with the Soweto uprisings, an event that has left its mark on virtually all South Africans old enough to remember, and ushered in the *Struggle Generation*, consisting of people who turned 16 between 1976 and 1996. Indeed, several other important events occurred around the same time to make this an important watershed, such as the first television broadcast (which also allowed people to see first-hand coverage of the uprisings) and the increasing foreign threats to *apartheid* posed by the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique as well as the new, avowedly anti-Pretoria Carter Administration in the United States. While the dominant picture of the petty *apartheid* and grand *apartheid* eras was one of acquiescence and stability, the principal theme of this age was violent resistance and reaction. Several thousand young people left the country in the years after Soweto and headed north to seek out the exiled ANC (and other organizations) and obtain military training. But it was internal resistance, initially -- and ironically -- sparked by the NP’s attempts to reform (and save) *apartheid* through the 1983 Tricameral Constitution that became the real hallmark of the era. The United Democratic Front linked a large number of church groups, civic organizations and trade unions in wide-ranging protests and boycotts, and triggered violent police repression, detention and bannings on the part of the state, culminating in two successive States of Emergency and the deployment of the army in black townships. It also featured intimidation of, and violence against those who might consider allowing themselves to be “co-opted” by the new elections for “own” Houses of Parliament for Coloured and Indian South Africans or for “Black Local Authorities” in urban townships, or who participated in homeland political systems. The UDF also became tangled in ongoing violent confrontation with alternative black organizations such as the black consciousness inspired Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) and Inkatha, the governing party of the KwaZulu homeland.

While the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners in 1990 might be seen as the start of a new era, the sharp increase in political violence between 1990 and 1994 means, for our purposes, that it was really just a continuation of the previous years of resistance, violence and reaction, rather than a significant departure. While the 1994 election and the passage of the 1996 Constitutions were certainly major events that left deep and profound memories, their real generational significance, even to an 18 year

old casting her first vote in 1994 or watching the ratification of the Constitution on television, was as the final act in a long trauma of protest, struggle and violence.

Rather, the real watershed should be most visible in those young people who came of age politically after 1996. Beginning in 1997, a group of people began to move through the ages of 16, 17 and 18 and enter the political arena with little if any first-hand experience of the trauma that came before: what are widely known in South Africa as the “*Born Frees*”. Their first political experience, possibly casting a vote in the 1999 election, was with a relatively normal, though clearly reform-minded democratic political system. While some backward looking dramas were still being played out, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the order of the new day was forward-looking: massive state investment in construction of houses and other infrastructure, the transformation of the state, educational reform, and growth oriented economic development.

The born frees: What should we expect?

Given the momentous changes just discussed, it would be logical to expect that the Born Free generation would be more “modern” than previous generations, with higher levels of education, urbanization and more cosmopolitan in their outlook. However, hypotheses about the Born Frees’ level of commitment to the new democratic regime differ sharply depending upon whether we focus – on one hand -- on the potential impacts of the newfound opportunities of the new political dispensation, or the new schooling curriculum and the move away from Bantu education, or focus – on the other hand – on the continuing legacies of *apartheid* on living conditions and the educational system.

In many ways, this new cohort clearly does confront a totally different world than that of their parents. There are no official limits to where they can go, work or live, or on whom they may date or marry. They have experienced a series of post transition elections that turn on new issues and personalities with diminishing links to the past. They consume news provided by a reformed public broadcaster, and have increasing access to privately owned radio and television broadcast news, as well as increasing amounts of private and international news on subscription cable or satellite television. South Africa has also posted a long period of economic growth in the early 21st century which was accompanied by a rapidly expanding new black middle class. And where the preceding generation was often seen as the “lost generation” with months if not years of schooling lost to school boycotts and political violence, the “Born


Frees” have come through most of their schooling without politically inspired interruption. They have received almost universal education in a reformed school system with a new curriculum and increasing numbers of black students attend heretofore racially exclusive schools and universities. Thus, theories of socialization would provide us with strong reasons to suspect that this new generation, with vastly different economic and political experiences and opportunities than their elders, and taught under a new school curriculum, may provide more fertile soil in which a strong democratic culture may take root and help consolidate South Africa’s fledgling democracy.

Yet South Africa’s relatively strong record of economic growth and deficit reduction since 1994 masks a bifurcated economy where levels of unemployment have hardly budged and the top and bottom of the income scales have moved further apart from each other than they were under *apartheid*. There is now a wider income gap between rich (the top fifth) and poor (the bottom fifth) blacks, than between blacks and whites as a whole (Leibbrandt and Levinsohn 2011; and Leibbrandt et al 2006). In many respects, many if not most the “Born Frees” face the same levels of enduring unemployment, poverty, inequality and hopelessness – if not worse so – as their parents. Official segregation has been replaced by class segregation, and the vast majority of poor and working class blacks still live in former townships and Bantustans. While a small minority can escape to previously white schools and universities, the majority toil away in increasingly dysfunctional schools with poorly trained teachers who struggle to cope with the new curriculum. The youngest generation confront other limits to their life chances in the form of escalating violent crime and HIV infection. From this perspective, many of the same theories of socialization might produce very different expectations about the political orientations of the “Born Frees” or at least for some segments of this generation.

Testing expectations

We begin by testing basic expectation about the basic characteristics of the Born Free generation. Using a series of nationally representative surveys conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (1998) and Afrobarometer (2000 to 2008), we can see that the Born Frees have increased rapidly from less than one in twenty eligible voters in 2000 (5 percent) to almost one third just eight years later (31 percent). By 2008, the Born Frees constitute the second largest generational cohort behind the “Struggle” generation (43 percent) but much larger than the “Grand Apartheid” (18 percent), “Petty Apartheid” (6 percent) and “Pre-Apartheid” (1 percent) cohorts.

Figure 1: South Africa's political generations in the post-apartheid era



But while the apparent scale and speed of demographic change in South Africa provides many possibilities for intergenerational differences in political outlook, we first need to examine the characteristics of the Born-Frees to see whether they in fact exhibit the kinds of structural differences that we might expect. As a result of the combination of the disproportionate bulge in younger cohorts characteristic of rural Africa and declining family sizes amongst white, coloured and Indian South Africans (as well as urban blacks Africans) and white emigration, the Born Frees are the most likely of all generations to be black (83 percent) and rural (43 percent) (Figures 2 and 3). Increased expenditures in education and school-building programs have not, however, had any noticeable impact on educational attainment. In fact, the Born-Frees are slightly less likely to have at least obtained a high school degree (48 percent) than the preceding Struggle generation (52 percent) (Figure 4). Beyond formal education, the data also indicate that they are not any more “cosmopolitan” than their older counterparts: they are not any more likely to be multi-lingual than the Struggle cohort (Figure 5) nor are they any more likely to report using a cell phone, computer or internet (Figure 6). They do, however, exhibit the lowest levels of religious affiliation (Figure 7) and religiosity (Figure 8).

Figure 2: Generation and race, 2008




Figure 3: Generation and urbanization, 2008




Figure 4: Generation and education, 2008




Figure 5: Generation and linguistic ability, 2008




Figure 6: Generation and technology, 2008




Figure 7: Generation and religious affiliation, 2008





Figure 8: Generation and religiosity, 2008



In the last two graphs, I examine generational differences in “commitment to democracy.” Commitment to democracy is a multi-item construct consisting of respondents’ answers to the widely used survey question on support for democracy (“democracy is always best”) and rejection of three forms of non-democratic alternatives: military rule, one-party rule, and presidential dictatorship (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). The result can be expressed either as the percentage of respondents who support democracy and reject all three non democratic alternatives (Figure 9), or as a mean score on a five point index that runs from 0-4 (Figure 10). These figures reveal two things. First, there seems to be little generational differences since Afrobarometer began asking these questions in South Africa in 2000. Second, there is no evidence that the Born Frees are more committed to democracy. In fact, they appear to often be the least committed.

But do these generational breakdowns of commitment for democracy obscure age-related differences that might emerge once we statistically control for other trends. I identify a set of potential predictor variables and cluster them into different theoretical families. First of all, in order to tap the direct effect of the political generations identified above, I use dummy variables for the “Born Free,” “Grand Apartheid,” and “Pre/Early Apartheid” generations, with South

Africa's *Struggle Generation* as the reference group. To ensure that any observed generational differences are not just a reflection of other demographic differences, I then add controls for gender, urban-rural, and racial differences (with dummy variables for white, coloured and Indian South Africans with black as the reference category).

To tap the purest impacts of “socialization-as-teaching,” I then enter a group of variables that measure formal education, news media use, membership in religious and community groups, cognitive sophistication, and political knowledge (measured here as the respondent’s ability to identify a range of incumbent office-holders). To measure the potential impacts of “socialization-through-new political conditions,” I use variables that ask respondents about people’s ability to enjoy a range of newfound freedoms (such as speech and movement), and their evaluations of the extent of equal treatment of all citizens, the secrecy of the vote, the freeness and fairness of the last election, and the responsiveness of elected officials to public opinion. To get at the potential impact of culture change through “habituation,” or learning by doing, I look at whether or not people had voted in the previous election, participated in community meetings and action groups, or taken part in violent protests. Finally, to get at culture change through “physiological and economic (in)security,” I use measures of unemployment, the Afrobarometer index of lived poverty, and questions that ask people whether they had been victims of, and feared crime, whether they had been victimized by corrupt officials, and whether or not they had lost a close friend or family members to AIDS. All of these are tested for in general, but more importantly through interaction variables that test for their unique impact amongst the Born Free generation.

Using the most recent, 2008, South Africa Afrobarometer survey, I now test for the effects of these variables through a full multivariate regression. These results show that holding constant for a wide range of individual level attitudes, behaviours and demographic characteristics, respondents belonging to the Born Free cohort are significantly *less* likely to be committed to democracy than other South Africans. Moreover, virtually none of the variables we would ordinarily see as channels or mechanism of socialization (formal education, cognitive sophistication, or civic group membership) have shape attitudes. Once we control for people’s evaluations of their new political conditions, we find that white respondents are appreciably more supportive of democracy, but whether or not this reflects differential socialization patterns within that community, or something else, remains to be seen.

Indicators of democratic habituation have some positive impact. Those who attend community meetings and join local action groups are significantly more

democratic. But those who have participated in violent protests are less so. There is also a strong impact of living in an urban area. This might reflect the quality of schooling (regardless of the level reached). But it might also reflect better social services and infrastructure, and needs further scrutiny in subsequent analysis.

The greatest impacts on democratic commitment, by far, are exercised by people's experiences with the political system and the economy. Those who feel the new political system successfully protects individual freedoms and guarantees a secret vote are much more likely to support democracy. Conversely, those who have been victimized by extortion at the hands of corrupt bureaucrats, who do not have a job, and who face grinding poverty are less democratic (yet, those who say they have lost a close friend or family member to the AIDS pandemic are *more* likely to embrace democracy).

Yet while we have seen that the Born Free generation is less democratic, all the negative coefficient of a dummy variable really tells us is that the intercept for this cohort is lower than for the reference group (the Struggle generation). The important question, however, is whether the other variables have different effects (slopes) across different generational cohorts. Ultimately, this is a question best exercised by examining the interaction of generational dummy variables and each of the other independent variables. As a first cut, however, I simply re-estimate this model amongst three generational groups: the Born Free, the Struggle Generation, and among older South Africans. The positive impacts of perceived freedom and a secret ballot, and the negative impact of being a victim of official extortion are relatively constant across generations. The role of urban residence, community participation, and being white are common to both the Born Free and Struggle generation, but not significant amongst older citizens (and the impact of being urban and being white are about twice as large amongst young people). The unique effects of being a member of the Born Free generation appear to be that contact with elected leaders reduces commitment to democracy, but violent protest has no effect (while it is correlated with reduced commitment among other citizens), and unemployment fails to have the same negative effect that it does amongst the middle aged Struggle generation.

Table 1: Explaining democratic commitment (0-4)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	2.88					1.83
<i>Political Generations (Struggle=Reference)</i>						
Born Free (0-1)	-.154***	-.127**	-.124*	-.107**	-.092*	-.076*
Grand Apartheid (0-1)	-.101*	-.100*	NS	NS	-.093*	-.112*
Pre/Early Apartheid (0-1)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
<i>Demographic Controls (Black=Reference)</i>						
Urban (0-1)		.299***	.243***	.180***	.192***	.156***
Female (0-1)		-.071*	NS	NS	NS	NS
White (0-1)		NS	NS	.300***	.325***	.251***
Coloured (0-1)		NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Indian (0-1)		NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
<i>Socialization by Teaching</i>						
Formal Education (0-9)			NS	NS	NS	NS
News Media Use (0-5)			.058*	NS	NS	NS
Religious Group Membership (0-2)			NS	NS	-.045*	-.044*
Community Group Membership (0-2)			-.087***	NS	NS	NS
Cognitive Engagement (0-3)			.051*	NS	NS	NS
Knows Incumbents (0-2)			.120**	.118***	-.098**	.085*
<i>Socialization Through Political Conditions</i>						
People Enjoy Freedoms (0-4)				.235***	.232***	.212***
Vote Is Secret (0-4)				.145***	.134***	.133***
Elections Free and Fair (0-4)				.044**	NS	NS

Able to Make Voice Heard (0-4)					-.043***	-.041***	-.042***
Elected Leaders Listen to Us (0-4)					NS	NS	NS
People Treated Equally (0-4)					NS	NS	-.026*
<i>Learning by Doing</i>							
Voted (0-1)						NS	NS
Community Participation (0-4)						.116***	.098***
Formal Contact (0-3)						-.090**	NS
Violent Protest (0-4)						-.120***	-.099***
<i>Physical and Material In/Security</i>							
Victim of Official Corruption (0-4)							-.146***
Criminal Insecurity (0-4)							NS
Unemployed (0-1)							-.126***
Lived Poverty (0-4)							-.062**
Personal Loss to AIDS (0-1)							.119***
Adjusted R ²	.006	.035	.050	.203	.218	.232	
N	2400	2400	2400	2373	2322	2307	



Cells report unstandardized multivariate regression coefficients (b's). Dependant variable is the *Index of Commitment to Democracy* (which is an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one party and one man rule)

Table 2: Explaining Democratic Commitment (0-4) Across Generational Cohorts

	<u>All</u>	Born Frees	Struggle Generation	Older South Africans
Constant	1.83	1.65	2.00	1.59
<i>Political Generations (Struggle=Reference)</i>				
Born Free (0-1)	-.076*	--	--	--
Grand Apartheid (0-1)	-.112*	--	--	--
Pre/Early Apartheid (0-1)	NS	--	--	--
<i>Demographic Controls (Black=Reference)</i>				
Urban (0-1)	.156***	.222***	.148**	NS
Female (0-1)	NS	NS	NS	NS
White (0-1)	.251***	.412***	.228**	NS
Coloured (0-1)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Indian (0-1)	NS	NS	NS	NS
<i>Socialization by Teaching</i>				
Formal Education (0-9)	NS	NS	NS	NS
News Media Use (0-5)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Religious Group Membership (0-2)	-.044*	-.115**	NS	NS
Community Group Membership (0-2)	NS	-.108**	NS	NS
Cognitive Engagement (0-3)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Knows Incumbents (0-2)	.085*	NS	NS	NS
<i>Socialization Through Political Conditions</i>				
People Enjoy Freedoms (0-4)	.212***	.238***	.208***	.178***
Vote Is Secret (0-4)	.133***	.128***	.144***	.137***

Elections Free and Fair (0-4)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Able to Make Voice Heard (0-4)	-.042***	NS	-.065***	NS
Elected Leaders Listen to Us (0-4)	NS	NS	NS	NS
People Treated Equally (0-4)	-.026*	NS	NS	NS
<i>Learning by Doing</i>				
Voted (0-1)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Community Participation (0-4)	.098***	.111***	.105***	NS
Formal Contact (0 3)	NS	-.157**	NS	NS
Violent Protest (0-4)	-.099***	NS	-.119*	-.200***
<i>Physical and Material In/Security</i>				
Victim of Official Corruption (0-4)	-.146***	-.150**	-.119**	-.186**
Criminal Insecurity (0-4)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Unemployed (0-1)	-.126***	NS	-.130*	NS
Lived Poverty (0-4)	-.062**	-.080*	-.081*	NS
Personal Loss to AIDS (0-1)	.119***	.208***	.142*	NS
Adjusted R ²	.232	.258	.279	.175
N	2307	707	993	582

Cells report unstandardized multivariate regression coefficients (b's). Dependant variable is the *Index of Commitment to Democracy* (which is an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one party and one man rule)

Finally, we take note of two findings about formal education. First, in contrast to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa where formal education (at least up to high school) makes a substantial contribution to support for democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes and Mughogho 2010), education has no significant impact across the South African population. This is understandable given that neither black nor white South Africans were exposed to pro-democratic teachings in the school curriculum, or certainly not of a non-racial inclusive democracy. But what may be of greater concern is the second finding, that increasing levels of formal education fail to contribute to pro-democratic support amongst the “born free” respondents. Clearly, if South Africa’s educational reformers intended that the schools would be the training site of new democratic citizens, something has gone terribly wrong. The new “outcomes-based” Curriculum 2005, introduced in 1997 and revised in 2002, was supposed to promote a series of values conducive to democratic citizenship. But, perhaps because of their attraction to “social constructivism” and the relative status of knowledge, the framers of the new curriculum seem to have been embarrassed at the prospect of replacing one official orthodoxy with another (Allais 2009). Thus, along with non-racialism and non-sexism, the curriculum attempts to embody democratic values across a range of “learning areas” such as arts and culture, life orientation, and social studies. But there is no place for the explicit teaching and discussion of democratic government, let alone the value and superiority of democracy as a form of government. To be sure, it is clearly possible to teach democratic values implicitly through a range of innovative methods, such as group participation and problem solving, but this requires highly skilled teachers who are provided with a great deal of curricular guidance and institutional support, both of which are in short supply in South Africa’s current schooling system.

Conclusion

In 1994, the combined prospects of demographic change and a radically changed political system might have held out the promise of rapid movement toward a transformed citizenry, based primarily on an emerging post-*apartheid* generation imbued with the values of the new South African citizen. To be sure, we have only tested for one of these values; and similar enquires should focus on other variables such as national identity, racism, government legitimacy, and participation. But as far as democracy goes, the post-*apartheid* generation remain as “lukewarm” as their parents and grandparents. Rather than re-drawing the country’s main cleavages along lines of age and generation (as in post-war Germany), the key fault have been replicated within the new generation. Whatever advantages might have accrued from the new political experiences of

freedom, liberty and self-government seem to have been neutralized by the disadvantages of enduring unemployment, poverty and corruption. Fifteen years on, South Africa's democracy remains as dependant on performance-based "specific" support as it hostage to performance as ever (Mattes and Thiel 1997).



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